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Abstract
Faced with a very prolonged period of low inflation, the Bank of Japan has been modifying 
its monetary policy strategy over the last two decades, pioneering the use of non-standard 
measures: it reduced policy interest rates to zero and, more recently, to negative levels, and 
has implemented several asset purchase programmes, forward guidance and, in September 
2016, a yield curve control policy. Despite all these efforts, Japan has continued to 
experience persistently low inflation, with rates well below the central bank’s target in recent 
decades. This document analyses the changes in the Bank of Japan’s strategy in its struggle 
against low inflation, focusing in particular on the reasons that led it to adopt the interest 
rate control policy, describes how this policy works and its main features, and assesses the 
results obtained. This new strategy has allowed the Bank of Japan to control the yield curve 
more effectively and sustainably, reducing the volume of asset purchases and mitigating the 
potential adverse financial stability effects. However, empirical analysis shows that it has still 
not succeeded in modifying the adaptive and persistent nature of the process of formation 
of prices and inflation expectations in Japan.
Keywords: monetary policy, inflation, inflation expectations, interest rates.
JEL classification: E31, E43, E52.
Resumen
Ante un período muy prolongado de baja inflación, el Banco de Japón ha ido modificando 
su estrategia de política monetaria en las dos últimas décadas y ha sido pionero en la 
introducción de medidas no convencionales: desde reducir los tipos de interés oficiales a 
cero y, más recientemente, situarlos en niveles negativos, pasando por varios programas de 
compra de activos y forward guidance, hasta la política de control de la curva de tipos de interés 
(Yield Curve Control) que implantó en septiembre de 2016. Pese a todos estos esfuerzos, 
Japón ha continuado registrando un período muy persistente de baja inflación, con tasas 
bastante alejadas del objetivo del banco central en las últimas décadas. En este documento 
se analizan los cambios en la estrategia del Banco de Japón en su lucha contra la baja 
inflación, con un foco especial en las razones que lo llevaron a adoptar la política de control 
de tipos de interés, se describen su funcionamiento y sus principales características, y se 
evalúan los resultados obtenidos bajo esta. Si bien esta nueva estrategia ha permitido al 
Banco de Japón controlar la curva de rendimientos de una manera más eficaz y sostenible, 
reducir el volumen de compras de activos y atenuar los potenciales efectos adversos para 
la estabilidad financiera, el análisis empírico muestra que aún no ha conseguido modificar la 
naturaleza adaptativa y persistente del proceso de formación de precios y de las expectativas 
de inflación en Japón.
Palabras clave: política monetaria, inflación, expectativas de inflación, tipos de interés.
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1 Introduction
Since the onset of the housing and stock market bubble in the early 1990s, Japan’s inflation 
rate has been persistently low and even posted deflationary figures in some periods. 
Inflation expectations have also been very low, with long-term ones trending downwards to 
below 1% from 2000, where they have since remained stable (see Charts 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). In 
an attempt to counter this situation, the Bank of Japan has resorted to innovative monetary 
policy strategies and been a pioneer in using various non-standard measures which have 
since been applied in other countries (see Chart 1.4 and Annex 1). The measures initially 
carried out included reducing policy interest rates to 0% in 1999-2001 (and to negative values 
in more recent years), using forward guidance for the monetary policy stance, and adopting 
various quantitative easing (QE) programmes, at first for relatively moderate amounts (in the 
period 2001-2006) and, later, for much larger amounts (after the 2008 global financial crisis).
 When Prime Minister Abe took office in 2012, a new set of economic policies 
were deployed. Nicknamed “Abenomics”, they were characterised by the combination of 
three policies (or “arrows”) aimed at pushing up Japan’s growth and inflation: a substantial 
easing of monetary conditions, a short-term fiscal expansion (as part of a medium-term 
consolidation plan to ensure public debt sustainability), and a series of structural reforms to 
raise Japan’s potential economic growth. In this setting, and with the intention of reaching the 
new 2% inflation target within two years, the Bank of Japan introduced a new Quantitative 
and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) programme in April 2013. This programme entailed 
a very high volume of public and private asset purchases that have continued to date, 
pushing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet to above 100% of GDP. Despite this 
sizeable monetary easing, inflation rates and inflation expectations did not achieve a lasting 
increase and remained extremely low, prompting the Bank of Japan to try new strategies. 
In January 2016, the Bank introduced a negative interest rate policy for a part of banks’ 
reserves at the central bank and, in September 2016, it adopted a yield curve control (YCC) 
strategy in an attempt to mitigate the possible adverse effects of low interest rates on the 
financial sector. Indeed, in addition to negative short-term interest rates, a 0% target was set 
for 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields, complemented by the commitment 
to allow inflation to increase above the 2% target and stay above this target in a stable 
manner for some time (known as “inflation overshooting”) with the aim of anchoring inflation 
expectations at this level. 
 This document describes the Bank of Japan’s experience with different monetary 
policy measures (in particular with the YCC strategy) and analyses their effectiveness in 
terms of achieving the Bank’s goals. The paper comprises five sections. Section 2 analyses 
developments in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy strategy over the last 20 years and 
discusses the reasons for the decision to adopt YCC in September 2016. Section 3 reviews 
the aspects of YCC and its effects on achieving the Bank’s goals. Section 4 contains an 
empirical analysis of the factors driving inflation in Japan and, in particular, the adaptive 
nature of the formation of prices and inflation expectations. Section 5 sets out the main 
conclusions and lessons learnt from the Japanese experience.
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INFLATION, INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY MEASURES IN JAPAN
Chart 1
SOURCES: Statistics Bureau of Japan, Bank of Japan, Consensus and Refinitiv.
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2 Monetary policy strategy developments in Japan
Inflation rates in Japan have remained at very low levels since the mid-1990s, following the 
effects of the asset price bubble correction at the start of the decade and the subsequent 
banking crisis. Barring some periods of substantial increases in commodity prices (e.g. 
in 2008) and hikes in consumption taxes (e.g. in 2014), this prolonged period has seen 
headline and core inflation in Japan move into negative territory (see Chart 1.1) and has 
also been marked by low economic growth, a declining natural rate of interest1 and major 
structural changes such as gradual population ageing.2 At the same time, long-term inflation 
expectations declined to around 1%, remaining flat for the last two decades. In turn, 
developments in short-term inflation expectations have been very much in line with actual 
inflation (see Chart 1.2). 
 Following a few initial years of very gradual cuts to the policy interest rate,3 the 
Bank of Japan has progressively adopted various measures since the late 1990s to attempt 
to find a way out of deflation. Having reduced interest rates to 0% in 1999, the Bank tried 
new non-standard tools, such as various QE programmes, negative interest rates and, lastly, 
yield curve control (see Chart 1.4). The following paragraphs briefly summarise the different 
strategies that the Bank of Japan undertook during that period, as well as their main effects 
on inflation. 
 Having made very gradual cuts to the policy interest rate over several years,4 in 
February 1999 the Bank of Japan resolved to adopt a zero interest rate policy (considered 
the “lowest possible” rate at the time), until the deflationary fears dissipated. However, this 
first experiment was short-lived, as in August 2000 the Bank considered that the economic 
conditions had improved enough to raise the interest rate, even though inflation was still in 
negative territory. Indeed, on account of the worsening economic outlook in early 2001 and 
the continued deflationary pressures, the Bank was forced to reintroduce the zero interest 
rate policy in February 2001 and, ultimately, to undertake a quantitative easing strategy.5 
 Thus, in March  2001 the Bank of Japan launched a QE programme with the 
intermediate aim of expanding the monetary base, primarily through JGB purchases and 
the consequent increase in banks’ reserves at the central bank. Purchase volumes were 
gradually increased during the term of the programme, and the central bank’s balance sheet 
reached 30% of GDP. Besides asset purchases, the Bank sought to strengthen its monetary 
policy through communication and forward guidance measures. It initially undertook to 
1 For evidence of this decline in the natural rate of interest, see Sudo, Okazaki and Takizuka (2018).
2   For  an analysis of  the  various global disinflationary  factors  that may have had a greater  impact on Japan,  such as 
demography, see, for example, Banco de España (2019).
3   The absence of a sufficiently firm reaction from the Bank of Japan during these years has been repeatedly highlighted 
and criticised as one of the reasons contributing to the setting-in of deflationary pressures. See, for example, Bernanke 
(1999 and 2002), Ito and Mishkin (2005) or Krugman (2015).
4 The Bank of Japan’s policy interest rate is the uncollateralised overnight call rate.
5  According to some analysts and even former members of the Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy Board, the indecision 
and policy reversals of those years contributed to undermining the central bank’s credibility in its struggle against 
deflation and making it more persistent. See, for example, Shirai (2018).
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maintain these quantitative measures until the inflation rate held above 0% in a stable 
manner. This forward guidance was further clarified in October 2003 through the introduction 
of two exit conditions: (i) core inflation should register 0% or above for several months; and 
(ii) prospective core inflation should not register below 0%. This state-contingent forward 
guidance contained necessary but insufficient conditions, as the central bank could judge it 
appropriate to continue with quantitative easing even if these two conditions were fulfilled.
In the period 2001-2006, when this first QE programme was underway, the Japanese 
economy recovered slightly (see Chart 2.1). This recovery was underpinned by favourable financial 
conditions, which helped the pick-up in domestic demand, and by the sound performance of 
exports, which benefited from the growth in external demand during those years and from the 
depreciation of the yen (see Chart  2.3). Having been in negative territory during that period, 
inflation edged towards zero in late 2005, and core inflation posted positive rates in some months 
(see Chart 1). In this setting, and with the improvement expected to take hold, the Bank of Japan 
decided to terminate QE in March 2006 and return to a monetary policy framework based on the 
short-term policy rate, which rose from 0% to 0.25% in July 2006 and to 0.5% in February 2007, 
where it would remain until October 2008. However, core inflation slid back into negative territory 
for the rest of 2006, and long-term inflation expectations, which had declined from 2% to 1% in 
the 1990s, remained at these levels, with no sign of any significant rally. 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the Bank of Japan once again applied non-
standard monetary policy measures, albeit on a relatively limited basis. With the slump in economic 
activity and the decline of inflation into negative rates, the Bank reduced the policy interest rate 
back to 0% in late 2008 and adopted a series of measures to support the financial system. 
In October  2010, a new quantitative easing programme (termed Comprehensive Monetary 
Easing, or CME) was launched. This programme, which would be in place until April  2013, 
entailed purchases of different assets, comprising not just JGBs,6 but also various types of 
private securities, including corporate bonds, commercial paper, Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) 
and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The programme aimed to maintain accommodative 
financial conditions by reducing yields and risk premia on a wide range of assets. The volume of 
the purchases was gradually increased during that period, although the amount on the Bank 
of Japan’s balance sheet did not exceed that of the first programme of 2001-06 (around 30% of 
GDP). In terms of the programme’s effectiveness in achieving the Bank’s targets, the cuts to long-
term interest rates gave some support to domestic demand, but inflation remained at negative 
rates throughout the period and long-term inflation expectations continued to be very low. The 
poor performance of inflation may have been partly attributable to the yen’s strong appreciation 
during those years, as a safe-haven currency (see Chart 2), in addition to various external factors.
Faced with this situation, and with the launch of the new Abenomics policies by Prime 
Minister Abe in late 2012, the Bank of Japan (by then under Governor Kuroda) undertook a 
new quantitative easing programme (termed Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing, 
6  Under the CME programme, the Bank of Japan’s JGB purchases were focused on the short end of the curve, with 
maturities of up to three years. 
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or QQE) in April  2013 with the aim of reaching, within two years, the 2% inflation target 
set in January 2013. This new QQE programme represented a most significant upscaling 
of the quantitative easing, as it entailed a substantial increase in public and private asset 
purchases7 and has pushed the size of the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet to over 120% 
of GDP (according to the latest data), a much higher volume than that reached by other 
central banks (see Chart  3). This new strategy initially seemed successful, as economic 
growth surged and financial conditions eased, with decreases in long-term interest rates, a 
substantial depreciation of the yen, and rising stock market prices. Headline inflation peaked 
at 3.7% in May 2014 and core inflation rose to 3.4% (1.6% and 1.4%, respectively, after 
discounting the effect of the consumption tax hike in April of that year). Even long-term 
7  In the QQE, the Bank of Japan extended the JGB purchases across the entire curve (up to 40 years), initially increasing 
their average maturity to around seven years. As a result of the October 2014 extension to the purchase programme, the 
average maturity rose to 7-10 years. Under this programme, private asset purchases were limited to ETFs and REITs, 
and purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds ceased.
GDP, STOCK MARKETS AND EXCHANGE RATE
Chart 2
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inflation expectations finally seemed to respond and neared their target level, reaching 1.5% 
(see Chart 1). 
However, the economic conditions once again began to deteriorate from mid-2014, 
owing chiefly to the adverse effects on domestic demand of the consumption tax hike imposed 
by the Japanese Government, and to the slowdown of emerging economies. Inflation decreased 
substantially, nearing 0% in 2015 (owing also to the slump in oil prices in 2014), and long-term 
inflation expectations slid back to close to 1%, where they have since remained.8 In response, 
the Bank of Japan accelerated the pace of asset purchases, from ¥50 trillion per annum to 
around ¥80 trillion, from October 2014.9 However, this exacerbated another problem, namely 
the Bank’s growing monopoly of the Treasury bonds market. Commercial banks’ holdings 
had declined substantially and they began to have problems in obtaining collateral assets. 
Consequently, the Bank of Japan began to also purchase from pension funds and insurance 
companies, taking advantage of the extension of maturities under the programme and the 
regulatory changes enabling these institutional investors to invest in other riskier assets. 
The Bank of Japan held 40% of total Treasury bonds (see Chart  4.1) and market liquidity 
suffered another bout of stress (with trading volumes declining and the bid-ask spreads rising). 
These problems were expected to be exacerbated as the Bank of Japan’s purchases increased.
Given this situation, in January 2016 the Bank of Japan decided to alter its strategy 
for stimulating the economy and introduced a negative interest rate policy for a part of banks’ 
8   For  an analysis of  the behaviour of  inflation expectations  in  Japan,  see,  for  example, Hogen and Okuma  (2018) or 
Nishino et al. (2016). 
9   Annual purchases were increased for Treasury bonds (from ¥50 trillion to ¥80 trillion), ETFs (from ¥1 trillion to ¥3 trillion, 
subsequently rising to ¥6 trillion in July 2016) and REITs (from ¥30 billion to ¥90 billion).
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANK OF JAPAN
Chart 3
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reserves at the central bank.10 The stated intention was to further reduce short-term interest 
rates and push up inflation expectations by strengthening the commitment to achieve the 
inflation target. However, the impact on interest rates was felt across the yield curve, which 
flattened most substantially. Yields at the short end of the curve (up to ten years) stood at 
-0.4%, while those on 30-year and 40-year bonds barely exceeded 0.3% (see Chart 4.2). This 
heightened the perception of this policy’s collateral costs in terms of financial stability risks, 
stemming from potential greater risk-taking and a smaller return of financial intermediaries.11
As a result of the foregoing, in the spring of 2016 the Bank of Japan decided to identify 
the problems facing its monetary policy strategy and the obstacles to achieving the inflation 
targets. To this end, a comprehensive assessment was conducted of the results of the QQE 
with negative interest rates and of the possible solutions for improving them. This report 
was discussed at the Monetary Policy Meeting in September 2016.12 Its main conclusions 
were that the reduction in interest rates along the entire yield curve had proved an effective 
means for stimulating the economy and that it provided a path out of deflation, but that 
10  The negative interest rate policy comprised a three-tier system. First, an interest rate of 0.1% was applied to the Basic 
Balance of banks’ accounts at the central bank, i.e. the average balance in the current account at the central bank, less 
minimum reserves in 2015; consequently, this amount is fixed. Second, a rate of 0% was applied to the Macro Add-
on Balance, comprising required reserves and the reserves for the outstanding balance of different liquidity facilities. 
Lastly, a rate of -0.1% was applied to the Policy-Rate balance, defined as the current account balance in excess of the 
amounts of the other two components. When the policy was launched, the Policy-Rate balance accounted for only 4% 





12 See Bank of Japan (2016a) and Kuroda (2016).
JGB HOLDERS AND YIELDS
Chart 4
SOURCES: Bank of Japan (financial statements) and Refinitiv.
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inflation expectations in Japan were more “backward-looking” or adaptive than previously 
thought, hampering the achievement of the inflation targets and making the disinflationary 
shocks more persistent. The report also acknowledged that the excessive flattening of the 
yield curve was affecting the return of financial intermediaries and that the JGB market could 
face some liquidity problems, given the expected increase in the Bank of Japan’s holdings. 
To resolve these problems, at that September 2016 meeting, the Bank adopted a new YCC 
strategy in order to reach its targets more efficiently and sustainably, prevent an excessive 
flattening of the yield curve and reduce asset purchases. The characteristics of this new 
monetary policy arrangement and its results to date are analysed in the following section. 
2.1 The Bank of Japan’s inflation targets
Before analysing the Bank of Japan’s experience with YCC, one final aspect that merits 
highlighting is how the Bank gradually changed its definition of the price stability target 
over the years, until it set an inflation target in 2013. After the 1990s financial crisis, the 
Bank of Japan Act was revised in 1998 to grant the central bank greater independence from 
the Ministry of Finance and to clarify its objectives, which became achieving price stability 
and contributing to maintaining financial stability. Previously, under the Bank of Japan Act of 
1942, its main objective was to help maximise potential economic growth. The new Act 
also allowed the Bank of Japan to weigh up the two objectives and to set its own inflation 
goals. In the early 2000s, the two objectives enjoyed similar importance but, as the financial 
situation improved, the Bank shifted its priority towards price stability. However, in terms of 
transparency in its inflation targeting, the definition of price stability, as a situation leading 
to neither a deflationary nor an inflationary outcome, was at first relatively vague, as it was 
feared that a numerical target could limit monetary policy flexibility. 
In March 2006, with the termination of the first QE programme, the Bank of Japan 
sought to further clarify its inflation target. To this end, it decided to explicitly set out what the 
various Policy Board members understood as price stability over the medium to long term, 
which comprised a range between 0% and 2%, centring around 1%. It was also decided 
that this “understanding” would be revisited each year and that it did not constitute a formal 
inflation target. In any event, the range specified was lower than that of other central banks, 
as the Bank considered it important to take into account the past developments in inflation 
in Japan (where it was well below that of other economies) and the different points of view 
of the Policy Board members. 
Six years later, in February 2012, coinciding with the setting of a numerical inflation 
target of 2% by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan adopted an inflation goal of 1%, 
within a range of 0%-2%. Notably, this was not related to the opinion of the Policy Board 
members, but rather to that of the Bank itself. Lastly, coinciding with the introduction of 
Abenomics, in January 2013 the Bank of Japan, together with the Japanese Government, 
decided to set an inflation target of 2% (in line with those of other central banks), with the 
intention of convincing the public of its firm resolve and commitment to achieving this target 
rate in a sustainable manner and thus anchor its inflation expectations. This has enabled 
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the public to gain a better understanding of the Bank of Japan’s inflation target, as can be 
seen in Chart 5, which shows that the public’s knowledge of the inflation target, relative to 
their knowledge of the financial stability targets, increased notably after this change. All 
things considered, the Japanese case illustrates the difficulties of establishing an ambitious 
inflation target when inflation rates and inflation expectations have been substantially below 
that target for a prolonged period (see, for example, Ehrmann (2015) or Shirai (2018)).
RELATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRICE STABILITY TARGET
Chart 5
SOURCES:  Bank of Japan's Opinion Survey and IMF (2020).
a The index measures the ratio of the percentage of responses in the Bank of Japan's Opinion Survey that indicate knowledge of the price stability 
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3 Yield curve control strategy in Japan
In September 2016, the Bank of Japan introduced YCC through which, in addition to setting 
the short-term policy interest rate applicable to some accounts at the central bank, a target 
of 0% was established for 10-year JGB yields.13 Future changes in the monetary policy 
stance would be made by modifying these interest rates. To control the yield curve, the Bank 
would continue to purchase Treasury bonds at different maturities,14 even though the YCC 
policy would mean abandoning the previous quantitative target (to change the monetary 
base) in favour of a price target (to control interest rates). In this respect, the volume of 
assets to be purchased became endogenous, and the Bank of Japan would purchase/sell 
securities as needed in order to stabilise the yield around the target, depending on whether 
it were above or below, respectively, the target. If the target set were credible, the Bank of 
Japan was confident that it would be able to reduce the pace of asset purchases. However, 
in an attempt to prevent this change of strategy (i.e. the possible reduction of the Bank of 
Japan’s purchases and the effective increase in long-term interest rates from very low levels) 
being interpreted as a tightening of the monetary policy stance, the guidance that JGB 
purchases would amount to around ¥80 trillion per annum was initially maintained.15 
 The other component of the Bank of Japan’s new strategy was the commitment 
to maintain the increase in the monetary base until inflation exceeded the target of 2% 
and stayed above this target in a stable manner, i.e. for a considerable period of time. This 
inflation-overshooting commitment (a form of state-contingent forward guidance) was 
intended to underscore the Bank’s determination and help anchor inflation expectations 
at the 2% target. Subsequently, in July 2018, the Bank strengthened its forward guidance 
by committing to maintain short and long-term interest rates at their current levels, at 
least until after the consumption tax hike scheduled for October 2019. State-contingent 
forward guidance for interest rates (based on reaching the inflation target on a lasting 
basis) was introduced in the autumn of 2019.16 Since then, market expectations have 
factored in a prolonged period of low interest rates, as the channel of interest rate 
expectations is another means, in addition to asset purchases, through which the Bank 
of Japan can control the yield curve.
13  See Bank of Japan (2016b). Annex 2 shows other central banks’ experiences with YCC strategies, both in the past 
and at present.
14  The references to the average maturities of Treasury bond purchases were removed. YCC is conducted through two types 
of operations. In regular operations, the Bank of Japan purchases Treasury bonds across all maturities through competitive 
auctions,  in which  it establishes a  reference rate which  is used by financial  institution counterparties when submitting 
their bids. In turn, irregular operations (fixed-rate purchase operations) are executed rapidly when the 10-year JGB yield 
exceeds the target, with the Bank of Japan setting the target yield and offering unlimited purchases.
15  The guidance regarding ETF and REIT purchases remained unchanged. Subsequently, in the April 2020 meeting, the 
Bank of Japan removed the reference to the purchase of Treasury bonds for ¥80 trillion per annum. In March 2021, 
the reference to the annual targets for ETF and REIT purchases was removed, and purchases were capped at 
¥12  trillion and ¥180 billion,  respectively. This cap  (which was higher  than  the annual  targets set) was  temporarily 
introduced at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure financial market stability. Among the adverse effects of 
these purchases, Bank of Japan (2021) cites the potential losses on the central bank’s balance sheet that could stem 
from these assets and, in the case of ETF purchases, the possible corporate governance problems that could arise at 
listed firms, especially if they track the Nikkei index. To address this, the Bank of Japan has increased its purchases 
of ETFs tracking the TOPIX.
16   Under the new YCC strategy, the Bank of Japan placed less emphasis on the time expected to achieve the inflation 
target, in view of its previous experience of the continued delays in its outlook. 
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 How effective has YCC been in achieving the Bank of Japan’s targets? As regards 
the functioning of the YCC strategy and financial stability matters, the volume of Treasury 
bond purchases by the Bank of Japan declined substantially, from the previous amount 
of ¥80 trillion to around ¥20 trillion in 2019.17 However, purchases rose again during 2020 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the increase in public debt issued by the 
Japanese Government (see Chart 6.1). After the new strategy was launched, 10-year JGB 
yields increased to the 0% target, where they have held on a relatively stable basis in recent 
years, even in 2020 against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.18 While no fluctuation 
or tolerance bands around the 0% target were initially established, the markets implicitly 
presumed that interest rates could move between -0.1% and 0.1% (based on when the 
Bank of Japan made the purchases). In July 2018, the Bank of Japan adjusted its strategy 
and clarified the tolerance bands for the long-term interest rate targets, extending them from 
the previous implicit bands to +/-0.2% so as to have some greater flexibility when managing 
interest rate movements in response to economic and market conditions. Finally, in a further 
review of its strategy in March 2021, the Bank of Japan once again widened the fluctuation 
band for long-term interest rates, by five basis points, to +/-0.25%, thereby creating even 
greater headroom for altering interest rates based on short-term conditions and allowing for 
interest rate increases in the longer-term segments.19
At the same time, the slowdown in the pace of asset purchases helped raise 
the slope of the yield curve, especially at longer-dated terms (30 and 40 years), which 
returned to around 1%, alleviating the pressure on the return of financial intermediaries 
(see Chart 6.2). Indeed, the percentage of Treasury bond purchases at short maturities 
(between one and three years) has gradually increased over recent years, helping to 
contain the Bank of Japan’s share of 10-year bond holdings and push up the slope of the 
yield curve (see Charts 6.3 and 6.4). The Bank of Japan has chiefly purchased bonds from 
the Government Pension Investment Fund and from banks. Insurance companies and 
private pension funds have not been as inclined to dispose of their bonds, owing to the 
need to have safe long-term assets in their portfolio. 
Consequently, the Bank of Japan’s YCC strategy has succeeded in maintaining loose 
financial conditions and limiting the adverse effects of an excessive flattening of the yield curve, 
albeit starting from excessively low interest rates across the entire maturity curve, which meant 
reducing government debt purchases. In other words, there was a de facto tightening of the 
monetary policy stance. All things considered, the Bank of Japan deems this strategy to be a 
more effective, controllable and sustainable framework for achieving its targets. 
17  One of the most frequent criticisms of the Bank of Japan has been the inconsistency in having two targets (the 
quantitative asset purchases target and the yield target) at the same time. See, for example, Shirai (2018).
18  The media talked about this reduction in purchases and increase in long-term interest rates as an implicit tightening of 
monetary policy (stealth tapering). The scant bouts of volatility in the 10-year interest rate were successfully resolved 
through interventions by the Bank of Japan (see Hattori (2017)). Interest rates slid back into negative territory for a large 
part of 2019 as a result of foreign capital inflows.
19   In  addition, with  a  view  to  improving banks’ profitability,  in March 2021  the Bank of  Japan  introduced an  interest 
incentive scheme applicable to institutions’ current account balances at the Bank of Japan, depending on their usage 
of the liquidity facilities aimed at promoting lending.
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Nevertheless, it should be underscored that it is easier to control long-term interest 
rates when the central bank has a strong presence in the market, as is the case in Japan.20 In 
addition, the smooth operation of this strategy mainly hinges on the central bank’s credibility 
as regards achieving its yield target levels across the curve, which largely depends on market 
agents’ yield expectations.21 If these expectations are not aligned, a much greater balance 
sheet expansion could be needed to achieve the desired levels. And this is contingent on 
agents’ expectations of the economic conditions being consistent with this path of interest 
rates, which is more complicated in the case of long-term maturities, as such conditions are 
20 See Kuroda (2019).
21  See Hattori and Yoshida (2020).
THE BANK OF JAPAN'S JGB PURCHASES AFTER YCC
Chart 6
SOURCES: Bank of Japan and Refinitiv.
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more susceptible to considerable change.22 An added difficulty stems from being able to 
determine the optimal yield curve, given the problems in measuring a natural yield curve23 
and the absence of a widely-accepted theoretical monetary policy rule for linking it to the 
real yield curve. 
However, this YCC strategy has not yet succeeded in achieving the 2% inflation 
target or raising inflation expectations in Japan. While the interest rate control strategy has 
admittedly helped maintain loose financial conditions (with low interest rates and increases in 
stock market prices) and support economic activity, inflation rates remained below 0.5% in 2019, 
and long-term inflation expectations have held at around 1%. As a result of the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the measures adopted in response, including certain price subsidies, 
inflation rates have slipped back into negative territory, standing at -1.2% in December 2020. 
Given the little progress made on the inflation front, some analysts have questioned whether 
the Bank of Japan’s strategy is sufficient to reach the targets and whether greater adverse 
collateral effects will have to be addressed further down the line, such as possible fiscal 
dominance or the interference in the smooth functioning of the long-term bonds market. In 
its monetary policy strategy review in March 2021,24 the Bank of Japan maintained that, on 
the estimates of its macroeconomic models, the measures adopted since the introduction 
of the QQE and YCC had helped push up GDP by around one percentage point and inflation 
rates by 0.6 percentage points. However, it acknowledged that the largely adaptive nature 
of inflation expectations appeared to be the main obstacle to fully achieving its targets. The 
following section contains an empirical analysis of the causes preventing a more sustainable 
increase in inflation in Japan, despite the continued efforts in the realm of monetary policy.
22  For these reasons, some analysts and monetary policy authorities in other countries, such as the United States (e.g. 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems (2010), Bernanke (2016) and Brainard (2019)), suggest that it 
is more feasible to control the short end of the yield curve (for example, up to three years) than 10-year rates.
23  Methods for calculating the natural yield curve have been devised in recent years. See, for example, Imakubo, Kojima 
and Nakajima (2017) or Brzoza-Brzezina and Kotłowski (2014).
24 See Bank of Japan (2021).
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4 Factors driving inflation in Japan
What are the causes of this low rate of inflation in Japan over so many years, despite the 
amount of the monetary stimulus measures applied? The changes in the Bank of Japan’s 
monetary policy strategies in recent years, especially since the QQE was introduced 
in 2013, have ultimately managed to overcome the deflationary period of the previous 
decades and had a positive effect on economic activity and employment: the output gap 
turned positive as of 2014 (until the COVID-19 crisis), and unemployment has remained 
at very low levels (see Charts  7.1 and 7.2). However, both inflation rates and inflation 
expectations have stood far from the 2% target throughout this period. Among the 
factors most cited in the literature that can help explain Japan’s persistently low inflation 
rate are certain structural characteristics of its economy that hamper the transmission of 
monetary policy to prices. For example, population ageing25 and the consequent decline 
in potential growth (owing not only to the lower labour-market participation, but also 
to the deceleration in productivity) contribute to reducing the natural rate of interest26 
(see Chart 7.3), thereby bringing monetary policy towards the effective lower bound and 
impeding its effectiveness. 
Another aspect particular to Japan is the functioning of its labour market and, 
specifically, the scant wage response to changes in activity.27 Wage growth in Japan has been 
weak for many years, despite the increase in employment and the very low unemployment 
rate (see Chart 7.4). This behaviour is partially explained by the distinctive characteristics of 
the country’s dual labour market. In Japan, most workers are regular (i.e. full-time employees 
with a permanent contract), and their trade unions therefore tend to favour long-term job 
stability over demands for salary increases.28 Indeed, in the annual wage negotiations in 
spring (shunto), trade unions tend to take into account the previous year’s inflation, rather 
than target inflation.29 By contrast, non-regular workers, who have lower wages and less job 
security, are more sensitive to the degree of slack in the economy.30 
This wage behaviour in Japan helps explain another aspect specific to the process 
of formation of prices and inflation expectations, which has historically been characterised 
by a very substantial weight of past inflation and, in exchange, a much smaller role of 
inflation targets. This largely adaptive nature of inflation and inflation expectations in Japan 
25   Shirakawa  (2012),  Katagiri  (2012),  Anderson,  Botman  and  Hunt  (2014),  Carvalho  and  Ferrero  (2014)  and  Banco 
de España  (2019) point out  the deflationary effect of population ageing. There are several channels  through which 
population ageing can have deflationary implications, the most obvious being the reduction in the workforce, which, in 
turn, lowers consumption, investment and productivity. These all suppress both inflation and potential growth. Another 
factor mentioned in the literature is that, owing to their high savings, the elderly will be more reluctant to support 
policies that are conducive to boosting inflation.
26 See, for example, Bank of Japan (2016a) or Sudo, Okazaki and Takizuka (2018).
27  In the Bank of Japan’s comprehensive assessment report on QQE with negative rates (Bank of Japan (2016a)), which 
was drawn up in September 2016 before the introduction of YCC, one of the conclusions reached (the estimation of 
a wage Phillips curve) was that past inflation had a much larger impact on wages in Japan than in other advanced 
economies. See also Iwasaki, Muto and Shintani (2018).
28 See, for example, Shirakawa (2014).
29 In 2018, the Government attempted, unsuccessfully, to instigate wage increases of 3% in the shunto negotiations.  
30 See Shirakawa (2014), Aoyagi and Ganelli (2013) and Bank of Japan (2017).
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distinguishes it from other advanced economies, where inflation expectations are better 
anchored at the target and inflation tends to be more forward-looking. This was one of the 
main conclusions reached by the Bank of Japan in its monetary policy strategy assessments 
in September  2016 (before the YCC strategy was launched) and, more recently, in 
March 2021.31 These reports set out evidence that prices and wages in Japan are influenced 
to a large extent by past inflation in comparison with other economies and that inflation 
expectations also have very adaptive behaviour, making any inflation shock (such as the 
decline in oil prices in 2014) highly persistent.  
31 See Bank of Japan (2016a and 2021).
POPULATION AGEING, POTENTIAL GROWTH AND NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST
Chart 7
SOURCES: Cabinet Office, World Bank, IMF, Sudo, Okazaki and Takizuka (2018) and Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
a Potential growth is the year-on-year growth in potential GDP, which is calculated based on the output gap published by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook. According to Sudo, Okazaki and Takizuka (2018), the natural rate of interest is estimated through a 
new Keynesian DSGE model and defined as the real interest rate under a scenario in which the actual output coincides with the natural output 
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This section contains an empirical analysis of these aspects of the process of 
inflation expectation and price formation in Japan and seeks to verify whether the monetary 
policy changes made by the Bank of Japan in recent years have managed to reverse them 
to any extent. First, to illustrate the particularity of the price formation process in Japan, we 
estimate a standard Phillips curve, where inflation depends on the degree of slack in the 
economy (the output gap) in the prior period, import prices, and inflation expectations with 
a hybrid specification combining an adaptive component which considers past inflation 
with another component considering medium and long-term inflation expectations. The 
estimated equation is as follows: 
 
π t = 0.88 × π t-1 + 0.12 × π t
e  + 0.08 × ( yt-1 – y ⁎ ) + 0.01 × π tm + ε t LP
(0.00)
p – values within brackets. R2 = 0.75.
(0.00)(0.01) (0.03)
[1]
Where is headline inflation (CPI) in each quarter, in year-on-year terms, from 1997 Q132 
to 2019 Q4, excluding the effect of consumption tax hikes. The independent variables used 
include one-period lagged inflation (π t -1); π t
e LP33  (π t -1); π t
e LP represents the 6-10 years ahead expectations 
in the Consensus Forecasts;34 is the one-period lagged output gap, as is quite 
common in the literature; lastly, represents import prices, which are added as a control 
variable and calculated as the year-on-year change in import prices. The results of the 
estimate show that the price formation process in Japan is marked by a very high weight of 
the adaptive component of the expectations,35 a very low slope of the Phillips curve on the 
output gap36 and a very low coefficient on import prices.
Second, we analyse the formation of medium and long-term inflation expectations in 
Japan.37 To this end, we estimate an expectations equation whose specification includes the 
influence of past inflation and the Bank of Japan’s inflation target. The estimated equation 
is as follows:
    [2]
32   Chart 1 shows a clear decline in inflation expectations in Japan around 2000. To see the probable effect of this possible 
structural change on expectations, a test has been carried out with a start date in 2000 for the estimate, with hardly 







See Bank of Japan (2016a and 2021), Berganza, Del Río and Borrallo (2016), Guay and Pelgrin (2004) and Stracca (2007).
36   Other studies attest to the flattening of the Phillips curve in Japan since the 1990s (Nishizaki, Sekine and Ueno (2014), 
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p – values within brackets. R2 = 0.18.
(0.00)
+ wt 
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Where reflects, as in the previous exercise, 6-10 years ahead expectations in the 
Consensus Forecasts; we include as independent variables one-period lagged inflation and 
the inflation target   (π⁎), set at 2%. The equation is estimated with quarterly data, between 
1997  Q1 and 2019  Q4.38 The results of the estimate show that the process of inflation 
expectation formation in Japan is also characterised by a relatively significant weight of the 
adaptive component. As a result, past inflation is given additional prominence through its 
influence on long-term expectations.39
Based on these findings, we can analyse which factors lie behind Japan’s low 
inflation rate. To this end, below we estimate the components of the inflation deviation from 
the 2% target: 











Chart 8 shows the decomposition of the inflation deviations from the 2% target in 
Japan, drawing on the above estimates of the Phillips curve and the long-term expectations 
38   If we apply this same procedure for headline  inflation  in the United States and the euro area, we obtain a range of 
adaptive coefficients of  (0.05-0.09)  and  (0.04-0.05),  respectively,  using, as a measure of past  inflation,  that of  the 





40  Following the methodology of the Bank of Japan itself (Bank of Japan (2016a)), rather than directly estimating equation 
[4], a two-stage procedure is used to estimate the components of the inflation deviation from the target so as to thus 
maintain the shocks to the Phillips curve and to the long-term expectations equation. A one-step estimation would 
offer one single shock combining both of the foregoing shocks, with the consequent loss of relevant information.




p – values within brackets. R2 = 0.18.
(0.00)
+ wt 
π t = 0.88 × π t-1 + 0.12 ×  + 0.08 × ( y( t-1 – y ⁎ ) ) + 0.01 × π tm + ε t  0.40 × π t-1 + 0.60 × π
⁎ + wt ^ ^
π t = 0.93 × π t t-1 + 0.07 0.12× ×  + 0.08 × ( yt-1 – y ⁎ ) + 0.01 × π tm + ε t  π
⁎ + wt 
^ ^
π t – t slack + imports + infl.shock + expect.shock,π
⁎ =
π t = 0.93 × π t t-1 + 0.07 0.12× ×  + 0.08 × ( yt-1 – y ⁎ ) + 0.01 × π tm + ε t π
⁎ + wt 
^ ^
= 0.08 × × ( yt-1 – y ⁎ ) slack ∑ 0.93 i –1
= 0.01 × × m t – (i – 1)  imports ∑ 0.93 i –1
=  × – (i – 1) infl.shock ∑ 0.93 i –1  ε t ^
=  ×× – (i – 1) expect.shock ∑ 0.930.12 i –1  wt ^
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equation. First, despite the relatively flat slope of the Phillips curve, the contribution of the 
degree of slack in the economy is negative throughout the period, although it gradually 
decreases over time thanks to the improvement in the output gap. The contribution of import 
prices varies over time, very much in line with the yen exchange rate (which, for instance, 
depreciated substantially in 2013-14 following the introduction of the QQE). However, the 
other component helping to explain the inflation deviation from the target is the adaptive 
component, which is reflected in the contributions of the inflation shocks. These include the 
inflation shocks to the Phillips curve and their feedback through the weight of past inflation 
in both the Phillips curve and the expectations equation.41 
To check whether these results could have changed in recent years with the 
introduction of the various monetary policy strategies, we once again estimate the Phillips 
curve and the long-term expectations equation with 5-year time windows (rolling regressions) 
to analyse the parameters’ stability over time. Chart 9 shows changes in the past inflation 
parameters in the Phillips curve and the long-term expectations equation. The weight of past 
inflation in the Phillips curve remained very stable following the introduction of QQE in 2013 
and, although it appeared to decrease very slightly following the adoption of YCC in 2016, it then 
increased until the coefficient exceeded 0.8. As regards the equation of long-term inflation 
expectations, the coefficient on past inflation has gradually increased in recent years,42 with 
even the slight decrease following the introduction of YCC being purely temporary and swiftly 
41   These results are in line with other studies that also confirm the importance of the degree of slack, the low inflation 
expectations and appreciation in the exchange rate as the factors driving Japan’s low inflation rate since the 1990s 
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reverting. In sum, the two estimates lead to a similar conclusion: the changes in the Bank of 
Japan’s monetary policy in recent years have not yet successfully altered the largely adaptive 
nature of the process of formation of prices and inflation expectations. 
This strong degree of inflation persistence could be partly explained by how 
households and firms form their inflation expectations, and how the latter set prices.43 
First, household inflation expectations have consistently exceeded the 2% target. Chart 10.1 
shows the median of households’ inflation perceptions, together with their short and long-
term inflation expectations, according to the Opinion Survey, since 2007.44 While short-term 
inflation expectations show strong volatility, in general they have remained between 2% 
and 3% over the last decade. Meanwhile, long-term inflation expectations are more stable, 
having remained at 2% for several years.45 In terms of median expectations, this behaviour 
masks substantial heterogeneity across age cohorts: inflation expectations are lower among 
younger generations (who have grown up in a low-inflation or deflationary environment) than 
among older cohorts (who remember periods of high inflation)46 (see Chart 10.2). 
Against a backdrop of low wage growth, households’ tolerance of price increases 
is low,47 as they perceive prices to be high and that they will lose purchasing power, which 




46  See, for example, Diamond, Watanabe and Watanabe (2020), IMF (2020) or Bank of Japan (2021). This latest study 
by the Bank of Japan also shows that the younger the age group, the lower their inflation expectations and the less 
sensitive their inflation expectations are to changes in current inflation.
47 See, for example, Bank of Japan (2018).
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS IN JAPAN
Chart 9
SOURCE: Banco de España calculations.
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results in their spending plans being very restrained (see Chart 10.1). It is in this context of 
weak household demand that firms define their price setting strategy, in which they also take 
into account their competitors’ prices. Chart 10.3 shows Japanese firms’ short and long-
term inflation expectations, according to the Bank of Japan’s Tankan survey. An across-
the-board decline in expectations, from 1.5% to 1%, can be seen in recent years.48 Added 
to this is the intense competition among firms, which motivates them to try to limit price 
increases by instead using strategies such as discounts, reducing the size or weight of their 
products or incorporating technological advances that help them cut costs.49 All of this leads 
to businesses being highly cautious when increasing their prices and to the persistence of a 
very low rate of inflation in Japan.50
48   See Inamura, Hiyama and Shiotani (2017). Using a different data source, Kaihatsu and Shiraki (2016) show that firms’ 
short and long-term inflation expectations increased following the QQE.
49 For an analysis of these business strategies, see Bank of Japan (2018) or Imai and Watanabe (2014).
50 See Watanabe and Watanabe (2018).
AGENTS' INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Chart 10
SOURCES: Bank of Japan's Opinion Survey (household expectations), Diamond, Watanabe and Watanabe (2020) (expectations by age cohort) and 
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5 Lessons learnt from Japan’s experience
In spite of the Bank of Japan’s efforts to sustainably push up inflation to achieve the 2% target 
through the progressive application of different non-standard monetary policy measures and 
strategies, including yield curve control since September 2016, progress towards meeting 
that target has been insufficient.51 As shown in the empirical exercise conducted in this 
document, the findings of which are in line with those obtained by the Bank of Japan itself, 
one of the main obstacles to meeting the target has been the markedly backward-looking 
and adaptive nature of the process of formation of prices and inflation expectations in Japan, 
along with other structural features of the Japanese economy, such as population ageing 
and the decline in the natural rate of interest. And the various monetary policy strategies 
implemented by the Bank of Japan have not yet succeeded in overcoming these difficulties. 
 In addition, the Japanese experience highlights the limitations and side effects of 
the different monetary policy strategies. Thus, in a setting of very low interest rates, the 
implementation of sizeable QE programmes, accompanied by negative policy rates in 
the case of the Bank of Japan, may give rise to financial stability risks stemming from the 
excessive flattening of the yield curve, and to limitations and tightening in bond markets.52 
The main advantage of the YCC strategy that the Bank of Japan began to apply in 
September 2016 is that, in principle, it allows for more sustainable implementation of an 
expansionary monetary policy over a longer period of time, since it reduces the volume of 
purchases required to maintain long-term interest rates at the desired level and to raise the 
slope of the yield curve at longer maturities, mitigating any potential risks to financial stability. 
However, it is essential for economic agents to put their trust in the central bank’s credibility 
and ability to control the yield curve and for the defined target levels to be consistent with the 
economic conditions of the country concerned. The Bank of Japan53 considers that Japan is 
meeting those conditions, allowing it to continue its reflationary process gradually over time, 
by providing accommodative financial conditions and a boost to economic activity, which 
should translate into higher inflation rates and inflation expectations in the future.
In any event, the example of Japan also shows the difficulties of bringing inflation up 
in a sustained manner when there has been a protracted period of very low inflation, inflation 
expectations are disanchored and monetary policy is constrained by the effective lower 
bound on interest rates.54 These difficulties are compounded when a mindset of very low 
inflation, or indeed a deflationary one, takes hold among economic agents. Such a mindset is 
51  According to the Bank of Japan’s analyses, based on macroeconomic models, the different monetary policy strategies, 
particularly QQE from 2013 onwards, did allow the Japanese economy to move out of deflation and achieve higher 
inflation rates and economic growth than would have been possible without them (Bank of Japan (2016a and 2021) 
and Kan, Kishaba and Tsuruga (2016)). For other analyses of the macroeconomic effects of the different monetary 
policy strategies in Japan, see also Berkmen (2012), Hausman and Wieland (2014 and 2015), Ugai (2006), Michaelis 
and Watzka (2017), Dell’Ariccia, Rabanal and Sandri (2018) or Dufrénot, Rhouzlane and Vaccaro-Grange (2019).
52   See  the Bank of Japan’s assessment of  these potentially adverse side effects  for financial stability  (Bank of Japan 
(2016a and 2021) and Kuroda (2016)).  
53 See Kuroda (2019).
54 See, for example, Ehrmann (2015).
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ultimately self-fulfilling, since it strongly influences firms’ price-setting behaviour.55 According 
to the IMF’s recommendations,56 the clear and effective communication of inflation targets 
by the central bank, something that has only happened in Japan in recent years, is essential 
for overcoming these difficulties. In addition to the monetary policy stimulus measures, other 
economic policies could contribute to achieving those targets, particularly fiscal policies and 
structural reforms that would revive the Japanese economy and have a positive impact on 
economic agents’ expectations. 
55 See, for example, Shirai (2018).
56  See IMF (2020). The IMF also proposes some monetary policy alternatives, such as setting more achievable targets, 
introducing  a  target  range  of  1%-3% or  adopting  inflation  forecast  targeting.  Arbatli  et  al.  (2016)  suggest  adding 
incomes policies. 
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Annex 1 The Bank of Japan’s monetary policy strategies
THE BANK OF JAPAN'S MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES
Table A1.1
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
MeasuresStrategyDates
February 1999 – August 2000 Policy interest rate: 0%
Quantitative Easing (QE)
Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME)
Expanding the monetary base through bank reserves, which
became a monetary policy instrument for the duration of the
programme. The Bank of Japan’s current accounts
increased from ¥1 trillion to a target of ¥5 trillion, gradually
growing over the course of the programme to a target of
¥35 trillion
Temporary reduction to 0.15% and then to 0%
March 2001 – March 2006
October 2010 – April 2013 Financial asset purchase and a fixed-rate liquidity supply
programme. Initially, this measure was capped at a
combined amount of ¥35 trillion, most of which (¥30 trillion)
centred on the liquidity programme. This amount was
gradually increased to a maximum limit of ¥111 trillion,
mainly for asset purchases. But this amount was never
reached, and the programme remained at around ¥70 trillion
April 2013 – January 2016 Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) Purchase of financial assets for an initial amount of
¥60-¥70 trillion per year. Most were government bonds with
average portfolio maturity of 7 years. Other assets acquired
were Exchange-Traded Funds and Japanese Real Estate
Investment Funds (ETFs and J-REITs, respectively). In
October 2014, the volume of purchases was increased to
¥80 trillion, and the average maturity of government bonds
rose to 8.5 years
An interest rate of -0.1% was applied to part of the central 
bank’s current account balances under a three-tier system. 
In addition, assets purchases were held at ¥80 trillion
QQE with negative interest ratesJanuary 2016
September 2016 QQE with yield curve control Setting the short-term interest rate at -0.1%, and the long-term
interest rate at 0%, with an initially implicit fluctuation
band for the latter of +/- 0.1%. The annual target for
purchases was held at ¥80 trillion, but the volume of
purchases was in fact lower. This cap on purchases was
removed in April 2020. In July 2018, the fluctuation band for
the long-term interest rate was widened to +/- 0.2%, and
again to +/- 0.25% in March 2021.
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Annex 2 Other countries’ experiences of yield curve control
Central banks other than the Bank of Japan have at different times in recent history exercised 
control over medium and long-term interest rates. This annex gives a brief overview of the 
experiences of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England (following World War II) and 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia (since March 2020).1 
In April 1942, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury agreed to cap both the short-
term interest rates (0.375% for 3-month Treasury bills) and the long-term interest rates (2.5% 
for 25-year bonds), in order to keep down the costs of government debt issued to finance 
World War II. To this end, it purchased mostly short-term government bonds, sometimes 
in very large amounts. When the war ended, the members of the Federal Open Market 
Committee became increasingly concerned with the sharp rise in prices, once the controls 
imposed during the war had been removed. Inflation rose to more than 14% in 1947 (see 
Chart A2.1.1). To control inflation, the Federal Reserve removed the cap on short-term 
interest rates, increasing them substantially. However, the US Government managed to keep 
the cap on long-term interest rates for a few more years, for which the Federal Reserve had 
to step up its long-term bond purchases. Finally, in the context of the Korean War, inflation 
soared to more than 17% in early 1951, and in March of that same year, the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury decided to put an end to their accord and remove the caps on interest 
rates. To protect long-term bondholders, including banks and insurance companies, from 
suffering substantial losses, it was decided to convert 25-year bonds to non-marketable 
29-year bonds with 2.75% interest, with the Treasury absorbing the costs of this measure.
The Bank of England also embarked on a policy to control interest rates to limit the 
cost of financing the war, as it had done in World War I. Between 1945 and 1947, it purchased 
government debt to keep long-term interest rates below 2.5%. Following its nationalisation 
after the war, the Bank of England continued to purchase government debt for several 
decades (at least regularly until 1971), acting under the directions of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, until it was finally granted independence in 1998. As occurred in the United 
States, the yield curve control strategy in the United Kingdom had to tackle rising inflation, 
which reached double digits in several different years (see Chart A2.1.2). The examples of 
the United States and the United Kingdom show that an interest rate control policy aimed 
at keeping the cost of government debt low can turn into a form of financial repression, with 
the risk of monetary policy falling under fiscal dominance, which is difficult to overcome and 
may lead to significant surges in inflation. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia adopted a yield curve control strategy more recently, 
in March  2020. Specifically, it set a target rate of 0.25% for 3-year Treasury bonds (the 
same it had for the short-term policy rate). Unlike the two cases described above, for the 
Australian central bank the objective was not to ease the financing of public debt, but 
1   For more detailed accounts of these experiences, see, for example, Bartsch et al. (2020), Hetzel and Leach (2001) or 
Chaurushiya and Kuttner (2003).
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rather to contribute to meeting its inflation and growth targets by flattening the yield curve. 
In addition, the Australian central bank also uses forward guidance (interest rates will be 
maintained until progress is made towards full employment and inflation stabilises in the 
target range of 2%-3%), and has embarked on a government bond purchase programme. To 
date, the strategy adopted in Australia has been a success and the yield on the 3-year bond 
has been kept close to the target, which was reduced in November (in line with the short-
term rates) from 0.25% to 0.1%. This strategy has also succeeded in lowering the interest 
rate on borrowing for households and firms (see Chart A2.1.3). 
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH YIELD CURVE CONTROL (a)
Chart A2.1
SOURCES: Bureau of Labour Statistics, ECB, Refinitiv, Office for National Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia.
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